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Abstract
Over the past decade, institutionally-funded financial aid (or "tuition discounts") have been the 
fastest-growing item within most public four-year college and university operating budgets. One 
explanation for this trend is due to the changing structure o f public colleges' revenue streams, as 
tuition and fees have replaced state appropriations as a viable and predictable source o f funding. 
This analysis explores the extent to which expenditures on institutionally-funded financial aid 
generates additional revenue for public four-year colleges and universities. Using institutional 
data (n=175) from 2002 to 2008, the analysis implements a generalized method o f moments 
(GMM) technique and concludes that aid indeed can be leveraged for revenue generation. 
However, this relationship is only sustainable to a certain point. When unfunded tuition discount 
rates exceed approximately 13 percent, institutions may experience diminishing revenue returns 
to this financial aid investment.



















Tuition Discounting for Revenue Management 
Public colleges and universities have traditionally relied upon state appropriations as a 
primary revenue source for financing institutional operating budgets. Over the past two decades, 
however, this source o f support has been strained due to a variety o f changes in the nation’s 
economic, political, and demographic landscape (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; Heller, 2006). As 
these changes persist, public colleges and universities are seeking out alternative sources o f  
revenue to replace funds that were once publicly available. Tuition and fees' have emerged as 
one o f the most viable “alternative” revenue sources for many public four-year institutions, as 
this source accounts for 30 percent o f their total operating revenues (Desrochers, Lenihan, & 
Wellman, 2010). To the extent that students are now viewed as a source o f revenue, colleges and 
universities are experimenting with enrollment and revenue management strategies, such as 
“tuition discounting,” to capitalize on these resources (Hossler, 2004; 2006).
Tuition discounting is the practice o f awarding institutionally-funded financial aid in the 
form o f non-repayable grants and scholarships to students. Similar to state and federal grant 
programs, colleges provide aid to reduce the “sticker price” students pay for college. In 2008, 
students attending public four-year institutions received over $14 billion in grant and scholarship 
aid from federal, state, and institutional providers; campus-based aid programs accounted for 
approximately 33 percent o f this total amount (U.S. Department o f Education, 2009). If federal 
and state government offer financial aid, then why do colleges also aid students? This question 
has been asked by several scholars (Martin, 2005; McPherson & Schapiro, 1998; Weisbrod, 
Ballou, & Asch, 2010) and a common conclusion is that aid is used as an enrollment 
management tool to fulfill such objectives as enticing students to choose their college over a
1 Hereafter, “tuition and fees” is referred to as “tuition.”
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competitor, recruiting academically or athletically talented students, reducing price barriers for 
lower-income students, or to simply increase enrollment capacity (Curs & Singell, 2010; 
DesJardins & McCall, 2010; Reed & Shireman, 2008). By offering tuition discounts, colleges 
can “craft a class” o f desirable students that helps colleges reach various objectives (Duffy & 
Goldberg, 1998).
However, colleges also offer tuition discounts for revenue management purposes 
(Breneman, Doti, & Lapovsky, 2001; Cheslock, 2006). This is particularly true given the tight 
financial environment in which public institutions operate. Many institutions are becoming 
strategic in their use o f tuition discounts so that aided students not only enhance institutional 
prestige but they can also enhance institutional revenue goals. Institutions may desire to achieve 
a variety o f enrollment management objectives through the strategic use o f tuition discounts, but 
these efforts are ultimately conditioned by the financial benefits and costs associated with aiding 
students. It is from this perspective that the following study is framed because, from the 
budgetary standpoint, the most important reason colleges engage in discounting is to generate or 
enhance net tuition revenue (Lasher & Sullivan, 2005).
According to economic theory, the process o f aiding students can yield financial benefits 
for colleges. By enticing students and their associated  tuition dollars to enroll, colleges can 
strategically leverage aid to maximize (or at least enhance) the amount o f net tuition revenue 
generated per aided student. However, overly-aggressive or inefficient discounting strategies 
can sometimes reduce, rather than enhance, revenue streams (Davis, 2003; Massa & Parker,
2007; Redd, 2000). In today’s tight fiscal environment it is not in an institution’s best financial 
interest to offer tuition discounts that erode tuition revenue generation. If public institutions 
choose to engage in discounting to achieve revenue generation objectives, then it behooves
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administrators and college leaders to understand the impact this strategy has on the financial 
wellbeing o f the institution. To that end, this paper addresses the following research questions.
To what extent does the provision  offinancial a id  y ie ld fin an cia l benefits to public  colleges and  
universities? Secondarily, is there a po in t at which the provision  o f  institutional a id  no longer 
yie lds finan cia l benefits to the institution?
This study uses a dynamic panel dataset o f public four-year colleges (n=174) between 
2002  and 2008 to empirically examine the relationship between tuition discounting and tuition 
revenue generation. The panel dataset is robust with 1,218 total observations. Framed within 
microeconomic theory o f firm behavior, this study finds that tuition discounting can indeed be a 
tool for enhancing net tuition revenue, but only to a limited extent. After controlling for various
economic and institutional indicators, it appears that colleges offering unfunded tuition discount
2 • • • • • rates beyond 13 percent begin to yield smaller amounts o f net tuition revenue. This finding
implies that many public institutions are diminishing their net tuition revenues by aiding
students; institutions operating beyond this threshold may find it in their financial best interests
to design a more economically efficient method o f distributing financial aid. All institutions will
design aid strategies that align with their organizational culture, resource capacity, and academic
mission, but findings from this analysis urge them to take fiscal caution when engaging in
discounting practices. Results from this analysis have implications on the financial risks and
rewards o f current discounting trends, and they also draw attention to the tradeoffs that exist
when aiding students from unfunded sources.
The economic pressure to discount
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1 Tuition discount rates arc calculated by dividing total institutional aid expenditures by gross tuition revenue, as 



















The expansion o f institutional aid has steadily grown in recent years. This expansion can 
be viewed in relation to state higher education spending and trends in rising tuition rates. 
Nationally, states are scaling back appropriations for higher education which has resulted in 
students carrying a greater cost-sharing burden for their education (Johnstone & Marcucci, 2010; 
Johnstone, 2004). Due to this shift in cost-sharing, tuition and fees have risen inversely with 
state appropriations and institutions are now relying on students as a primary revenue source.
This can be seen in the table below, where institutions received nearly $5,000 in net tuition 
revenue per student in 2002 but by 2008 this value had increased to $6,649. Alternatively, state 
appropriations per student declined by nearly $1,000 during the same period. The financial 
structure o f public institutions has slowly shifted towards tuition reliance over the past several 
decades, but in recent years this trend has been accentuated (McPherson & Schapiro, 2006).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
There is a wide degree o f variation across the country with regard to state subsidization 
of public institutions. Some institutions receive relatively low levels o f state financial support, 
resulting in greater pressure to generate revenue from students through tuition and fees. These 
institutions may face greater pressure to discount tuition by providing aid from their own 
operation budgets. Alternatively, institutions may generate high levels o f state subsidization 
which allow them to keep tuition levels low for all students. When tuition is low, institutions 
may face little pressure to engage in discounting. The extent to which an institution relies on 
students as a revenue stream is a function o f state subsidies, and discounting strategies will 
invariably be designed to account for these trends.
Since public institutions charge resident and non-resident students two separate prices, 
there may be an economic incentive to recruit non-resident students in order to generate tuition
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revenue. Some public institutions seek to maximize non-resident enrollment levels in order to 
capitalize on the substantially higher price these students pay compared to their in-state peers 
(Zhang, 2007). Colleges that seek to enroll non-resident students may have financial gains, but 
they may also face greater economic pressure to provide non-residents with financial aid. So, the 
extent to which an institution enrolls students from out-of-state may not only impact net tuition 
revenue but it may also shape tuition discounting strategies. In the private sector o f higher 
education, these economic issues are not relevant since institutions charge a unitary price to all 
students and endowments, rather than state appropriations, serve as a primary source o f  
subsidization.
Recent discounting trends
In 2008, public four-year institutions awarded more than $5.4 billion o f institutional aid 
to approximately 22 percent o f their undergraduate students (U.S. Department o f Education, 
2009). To put this value into context o f the national student financial aid landscape, institutions 
provide approximately 33 percent o f total grant aid to undergraduate students. That same year, 
federal and state grant programs awarded $4.7 and $4.3 billion, respectively, to undergraduate 
students enrolled in public four-year institutions. Despite being a primary source o f financial aid 
for a significant proportion o f undergraduate students, little empirical research has been 
conducted on expenditure patterns o f institutional aid. Researchers tend to examine financial aid 
expenditures patterns at the federal and state levels, but less often at the campus level. Recently, 
this trend has begun to shift as more scholars are examining public sector tuition discounting 
patterns (Curs, 2008; Curs & Dar, 2010; Doyle, Delaney, & Naughton, 2009; Doyle, 2010).
When studies have looked at tuition discounting at the campus level, researchers tend to 
focus on private rather than public institutions. This is understandable, as private institutions
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have a long history o f aiding students and many o f these colleges are tuition-dependent which 
means they rely on aid to generate tuition revenue (Thelin, 2004; Wilkinson, 2005). However, 
the trend towards tuition discounting is not isolated to the private sector, and researchers have 
called for further inquiry into the role aid plays within public college and university budgets 
(Baum & Lapovsky, 2006; Hossler, 2006). Not until the late 1970’s and early 1980’s did public 
institutions began to experiment with leveraging aid in similar ways as their private sector 
counterparts (Potter & Sidar Jr, 1978; Wilkinson, 2005). Due to a low tuition model, combined 
with a relatively high degree o f governmental subsidization, many public institutions did not 
have much necessity to offer aid out o f their own operating budgets. But in today’s financial 
climate, new challenges exist for financial planners who are charged with projecting net tuition 
revenues and for the strategic use o f financial aid (Brinkman & Morgan, 2010). The provision of 
institutional aid is now a standard business practice in the public sector o f higher education. To 
be sure, expenditures on institutional aid have been the fastest-growing item in most public four- 
year college budgets during the past decade (Desrochers et al., 2010).
When public colleges offer grants and scholarships, the funds are generally available 
from one o f two sources. The most common source is institutional operating budgets, while the 
less common source is restricted endowment revenues. The fonner source o f aid is often 
classified as “unfunded” because the funds can be used for any variety o f alternative institutional 
objectives such as teaching, research, or service. The latter sources o f aid are considered 
“funded” when endowed funds are dedicated to supporting a specific financial aid program; 
these funds cannot be used for other institutional objectives. Unlike funded aid, unfunded aid is 
subject to the competing opportunity costs associated with various institutional priorities and are 
thus subject to the law o f diminishing returns (Martin, 2004; 2005). The difference between
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funded and unfunded aid has significant policy implications for campus officials, particularly 
among private colleges that operate large endowments (Allan & Lapovsky, 2005). Most public 
colleges do not have large endowment payouts, so the way in which unfunded aid is leveraged 
bears significant financial implications for many o f these institutions (Lapovsky, 2007).
The average discount rate for public four-year institutions in this study is approximately
16 percent, which means that these institutions retain SO.84 for every tuition dollar they charge. 
Funded and unfunded discount rates are approximately 4 and 12 percent, respectively. Other 
analyses have found similar discount rates ranging between 14 and 20 percent in recent years 
(Baum & Lapovsky, 2006; Baum, Lapovsky, & Ma, 2010; Desrochers et al., 2010).
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Review of the literature
Public colleges have invested a significant amount o f resources into financial aid to meet 
a variety o f enrollment management and revenue management objectives. Literature on tuition 
discounting tends to focus on the former objective, while there is a significant amount o f work to 
be done in understanding the latter. The purpose o f this study is to examine the revenue 
management objectives o f aiding students, yet the enrollment management purposes can not be 
ignored. Colleges design aid programs to achieve a range o f such enrollment outcomes as 
encouraging academically talented students to enroll in college (Curs, 2008; Ehrenberg, Zhang,
& Levin, 2006), reducing price barriers for students demonstrating financial need (Pema, Lundy- 
Wagner, Yee, Brill, & Tadal, 2010), encouraging students to persist (Chen & DesJardins, 2010; 
Hossler, Ziskin, Gross, Kim, & Cekic, 2009; Perna, 2010), and even simply meeting the 
institution’s enrollment capacity (Curs & Singell, 2010; DesJardins & McCall, 2010). Several 
researchers have examined how aid influences these enrollment outcomes, revealing a nontrivial
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relationship between aid and student participation or persistence behaviors. When one turns 
attention towards the revenue management purposes o f tuition discounting, however, the 
literature becomes less comprehensive.
McPherson and Schapiro (1998) provide a starting point from which one can frame the 
revenue management objectives o f tuition discounting. Reflecting upon their experiences with 
campus leadership teams and their observations o f national trends, the authors explain that 
financial aid is a necessary revenue management tool that has developed from the "intense 
competition among colleges and universities for dollars and students.” To them, student 
financial aid is a “strategic variable” for ensuring the financial wellbeing o f an institution. In 
order to achieve desired financial outcomes, McPherson & Schapiro (1998) explain that colleges 
can intentionally exploit students’ willingness to pay in order to extract their consumer surplus. 
Engaging in this revenue management tactic will, in theory, maximize tuition revenue for the 
institution. In practice, however, institutions offer aid without a thorough interpretation o f each 
student’s willingness to pay. As a result, some students end up paying a significantly lower price 
than what they would actually be willing to pay and the provision o f aid can be viewed as an 
economically inefficient allocation o f resources if  an institution is awarding “too much” aid to 
students.
Martin (2005) offers an economic model to further describe the relationship between aid 
and revenue generation. To ensure that an institution is maximizing its tuition revenue, he 
explains that the revenue associated with enrolling an additional student should always exceed 
the average cost o f institutional aid. If an institution spends more money on a student compared 
to the amount it generates from that student’s tuition payment, then the college will operate an 
inefficient aid program that diminishes overall net tuition revenue. A degree o f inefficiency is
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expected within the higher education production function; however, aid expenditures are one of 
only a few variable cost items within operating budgets. More uniquely, aid expenditures are 
one o f very few budgetary items that can also generate short-term revenue gains.
An example o f strategic alignment o f discounts for revenue generation can be seen in 
Massa and Parker’s (2007) analysis o f a private liberal arts college. In the late 1990’s, Dickinson 
College had been discounting their tuition by more than 50 percent to incoming freshmen. The 
institution was only generating $0.48 cents for every dollar charged in tuition. At this pace, the 
institution would approach long-run fiscal insolvency or at least fiscal strain. To avoid this “net 
tuition revenue dilemma,” the institution reduced its discount rate to approximately 30 percent by 
2007 and actually generated greater amounts o f tuition revenue in the process. Their solution 
included a strategic effort to target aid to a smaller portion o f the student body while 
simultaneously analyzing students’ willingness to pay. Between the late 1990’s and mid 2000’s, 
students continued to express high demand for a Dickinson College degree, so they continued to 
enroll even if  they did not benefit from as deep o f discounts earlier cohorts received. The 
authors concluded that “discounting gone wild can handcuff a college...where it doesn’t have 
sufficient revenue to cover expenditures or it reduces expenditures and threatens the quality o f  
educational experience” (Massa & Parker, 2007). Many public institutions do not have as 
inelastic demand curves as Dickinson College or other elite private institutions, yet the 
fundamental economic lessons from the private sector experience remain relevant to public 
institutions.
An additional empirical example o f aid’s relationship to net tuition revenue is found in 
Summers (2004). Here, the author utilizes institution-level data from 1997 to 2000 to uncover a 
statistical relationship between institutional aid awards and net tuition revenue among private
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colleges and universities. After implementing an econometric model, net tuition revenue was 
found to increase when expenditures on institutional aid increase. This linear and positive 
relationship led the author to conclude that aid is being “distributed in a manner that boosts 
enrollment and earns a net revenue return from these expenditures.” However, such a conclusion 
is counter-intuitive to the economic theory and to that which was found in Massa and Parker’s 
(2007) analysis. Aid is expected to increase tuition revenue, but after a certain point there is a 
high likelihood that aid actually diminishes this source o f revenue. In other words, the cost o f  
aiding students is expected to eventually outweigh the (financial) benefits o f enrolling students. 
Summers’ model does not account for this possibility.
Considering the limited empirical findings that have tested this economic model, in 
addition to the conflicting results that have surfaced, questions remain regarding aid’s 
relationship to net tuition revenue. Do similar patterns found in Massa and Parker (2007) hold 
when multiple institutions are analyzed? Also, to address Summers’ work (2004), is it possible 
that the relationship between aid and revenue is hill-shaped rather than linear, where aid can 
generate additional revenues only to a certain threshold at which time revenues begin to decline 
when "too much" aid is awarded?
Conceptual framework
Microeconomic theory o f nonprofit finn behavior serves as the conceptual framework 
informing the empirical model. Under this framework, colleges and universities are expected to 
maximize their utility by allocating resources according to each institution’s unique social and 
academic missions. Despite the heterogeneity o f  institutional missions, one measure o f “utility” 
that all institutions desire to maximize is reputation and prestige (Bowen, 1980; Brewer, Gates,
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enrollment management (SEM) practices that are designed to “craft a class” o f the “best and 
brighetest” students (Duffy & Goldberg, 1998; Ehrenberg et al., 2006). Financial aid has 
emerged as a common SEM practice for recruiting and retaining students since scholarships and 
grant aid can entice students to make enrollment decisions (Hossler, 2000).
By strategically allocating financial aid, colleges are able to enhance their academic 
reputations by recruiting students who have high SAT scores. Similarly, institutions that are able 
to recruit nationally may be perceived as being more prestigious than those that recruit regionally 
(Brewer et al., 2002). A utility-maximizing college using SEM practices may decide to offer 
deep discounts to students based on SAT scores or “out-of-state” residency status if  institutional 
decision-makers believe these students will enhance the institution’s academic reputation. 
Similarly, institutional leaders may target discounts to minority and low-income students in order 
to “build or maintain prestige at a national and general level.. .[by] becom ing] more and more 
inclusive,” (Brewer et al., 2002, p. 62). To the extent these discounting practice enhance 
reputation and prestige, colleges will pursue them even if  it diminishes net tuition revenue.
However, as public colleges become increasingly tuition-dependent, they are becoming 
increasingly concerned about the revenue implications o f discounting practices (Hossler, 2006). 
When shifting attention to the fiscal impact o f SEM strategies, tuition discounts can be viewed as 
a revenue m anagement tool that helps institutions enhance their financial conditions. The 
following discussion will briefly demonstrate how institutional decision-makers and SEM 
professionals might approach tuition discounting as a revenue management tool; for further 
discussion please see Breneman et al. (2001)and Cheslock (2006).
In Figure 1, an institution charging tuition at point P i will enroll students up to the point 
Qi, where the downward-sloping line (D) represents the students’ aggregate elasticity o f  demand.
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If the institution discounts its price to P 2, then enrollment will increase to the point o f demand, or 
Q2. The area within points Pi, Ai, Qj, represents the institution's gross tuition revenue from non­
aided students, and the area under A }, A 3 , Q2, Qi, represents the gross tuition revenue o f aided 
students. The area within A 7, A 2, A 3  represents the amount o f institutional aid necessary to entice 
students to enroll to the point Q2, so this amount is subtracted from gross tuition revenue to 
calculate net tuition revenue. Net tuition revenue is expressed in this figure as the non-shaded 
region below Pi, A 1 , A 3 , Q2, and the origin. Due to the two-tiered pricing structure o f public 
institutions, resident and non-resident students face two distinctly different tuition levels and 
consequently, two different demand elasticities.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The nature o f this relationship is subject to the economic phenomenon o f diminishing 
returns. For instance, if  an institution offered a 100 percent discount rate to all students, then it 
would reduce the price they pay to zero and enrollment could be maximized to the point o f  
capacity. As a result o f fully discounting tuition for all students, however, this institution would 
no longer yield any net tuition revenue. The shaded area o f A j, A2, and A 3  would be greater than 
the gross tuition revenue associated with enrolling students; the financial returns o f aiding 
students would diminish to zero. Because o f this tradeoff, it would be inefficient and 
unsustainable for tuition-dependent institutions to offer full discounts to all students. 
Microeconomic theory suggests that institutions can only provide discounts up to a certain point 
and any additional movement beyond this point will begin to diminish net revenues. It may be 
tempting for colleges to spend additional money on aid simply to maximize their net tuition 
revenue because o f the potential financial benefits; however, the risk o f diminishing tuition 
revenues is profound.
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To the extent that colleges seek to maximize reputation and prestige, they will likely 
design tuition discounting strategies that allocate aid in relation to students’ SAT scores, 
residency status, racial/ethnic diversity, or socioeconomic status. Using aid to craft a class of 
desirable students is an SEM practice that can help institutions improve their perceived 
reputation and academic profile. However, tuition discounts can also be utilized for revenue 
management purposes as demonstrated in Figure 1. While the ultimate goal o f tuition 
discounting may be to enhance the reputational profile o f the institution, we cannot overlook the 
financial implications associated with these SEM trends.
Em pirical techniques
D ata sources. Public four-year colleges and universities in the U.S. are the primary unit 
of analysis for this study. Because o f the unique financial environment and microeconomic 
frameworks in which state-funded institutions operate, this analysis excludes all private 
institutions. The Delta Cost Project provided institution-level data from the U.S. Department o f  
Education IPEDS database. Delta Cost Project data disaggregates financial aid data between 
“funded” and “unfunded” sources, which is unavailable through IPEDS.
In 2002, a broad range o f accounting standards changed the way some institutions report 
financial aid records. Accordingly, this analysis includes those institutions charging tuition and 
offering financial aid for each year between 2002 and 2008 (the most recent year available) 
creating a panel dataset o f 174 institutions over seven years (n=1218). Institutions voluntarily 
reported interstate migration data for odd-numbered years, thus reducing the sample size to 
include only those reporting data in all years between 2002 and 2008. All financial data are 
inflation-adjusted using the 2008 Consumer Price Index.
University of Utah Institutional Repository
A uthor M anuscript



















Outcome variable. Variables are selected based on the conceptual theory outlined above. 
The outcome o f interest is net tuition revenue per full-time equivalent student (.NTR) which is 
calculated by the gross tuition revenue less tuition discounts excluding tuition waivers. Under 
this definition, net tuition revenue is the final amount o f funds brought into institutional budgets 
from student tuition payments.
Predictor variables. Net tuition revenue is expected to be a function o f the following 
economic factors described in the conceptual framework: resident and non-resident sticker price, 
resident and non-resident enrollment, and the tuition discount rate. Sticker price is the published 
amount charged to students during the fall semester and does not include other charges such as 
room, board, books, supplies, or transportation. Enrollment levels by student residency status are 
reported for first-time, full-time incoming freshmen students. The percent o f in-state and out-of­
state freshmen is multiplied by the institution's undergraduate FTE to estimate total institutional 
enrollment levels based on residency status. While not an exact measure, this procedure serves 
as a proxy for institutional enrollment mix. Funded and unfunded tuition discount rates are the 
key predictor variables o f interest and are introduced into the model both linearly and 
quadratically to account for the potential diminishing returns described in the conceptual 
framework.
The purely economic model does not control for unique institutional characteristics that 
are expected to influence net tuition revenues. To that end, additional variables described in the 
literature review and conceptual framework are introduced in a second model. This model 
includes the economic predictors in addition to such predictors as: percent o f undergraduate 
students who are ethnic/racial (i.e. non-white) minorities, the median SAT score for the incoming 
freshman cohort, institutional selectivity, and the degree o f state subsidization. For SAT, only
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the 25th and 75th percentile verbal and math scores are available in the dataset, so the average of 
these two data points are added together as an estimated median SAT score. In the event that 
ACT is the dominant standardized test for an institution, then these scores are converted to SAT 
scores based on the College Board concordance tables (College Board, 2010). Institutional 
selectivity is calculated by dividing the number o f admitted freshmen by the number of 
applicants, and state subsidization is the total amount o f current-year state appropriations by 
FTE. Each o f these variables is continuous in scale and is described in Table 3 below.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Several o f these predictor variables are introduced into the model endogenously: 
estimated in-state and out-of-state enrollment, SAT, selectivity, percent minority, and percent 
low-income. While this analysis is framed around the assumption that the outcome institutions 
seek to maximize (or at least enhance) is net tuition revenue, there are several alternatively 
compelling outcomes related to tuition discounting practices. The pursuit for high-achieving 
students as measured by SAT score and selectivity, the priority o f ensuring greater student 
diversity along the lines o f race and ethnicity, and assisting low-income students are but three 
motivations driving colleges to engage in discounting. It is unclear whether gains in net tuition 
revenue are leveraged to “craft a class” o f desirable students, or whether the opposite may occur; 
these variables both influence and are influenced by net tuition revenue. Additionally, the key 
variable o f interest (the unfunded tuition discount rate) is endogenous to the model because aid is 
utilized to generate revenue but institutions generating greater revenue are able to provide 
additional aid to students. As a result, this model runs the risk o f yielding biased or inefficient 
parameter estimates. Accordingly, a generalized method o f moments model is designed which 
utilizes instrumental variable techniques to improve model consistency and efficiency. Unit root
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tests concluded that no endogenous predictors were stationary, thus warranting the use o f this 
technique.
Analytical techniques. This analysis implements an Arellano-Bond generalized method 
of moments (GMM) technique designed for dynamic panel data estimation (Blundell, Bond, & 
Windmeijer, 2000; Bond, 2002; Roodman, 2006). Within higher education literature, GMM 
techniques have been used to study the impact o f state higher education finance on degree 
productivity (Titus, 2009) and how changes in student loan interest rates affect student loan 
volume (Austin, 2010). One o f the reasons why researchers have found utility in GMM is 
because the technique allows for the inclusion o f lagged values o f the outcome variable on the 
right-hand side o f the regression equation. It is quite likely that past outcomes (e.g. past degree 
productivity or loan volume) are strong predictors o f current and future outcomes, but standard 
OLS and fixed-effects regression will produce biased parameter estimates if  lagged dependent 
variables are included as predictors (Kiviet, 1995; Nickell, 1981). In this study, we expect that 
past levels o f net tuition revenue are relevant predictors o f future net tuition revenue values. 
Researchers recommend using GMM to estimate dynamic models that include lagged dependent 
variables as predictors (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998).
GMM is also able to produce consistent and efficient estimates that are robust to model 
endogeneity. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) methods are more commonly utilized to improve 
model consistency and efficiency when endogenous variables are present, but it is often difficult 
in social science research to find “good” instruments that are both strong and valid (Baum, 
Schaffer, & Stillman, 2003; Halaby, 2004). To generate consistent and efficient estimates, 2SLS 
techniques require the researcher to identify and introduce exogenous instrumental variables that 
correlate with the endogenous predictor(s) while also being orthogonal to the error term.
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Researchers warn, however, that the “cure” o f introducing an exogenous variable via 2SLS can 
be worse than the “disease” o f endogeneity if  the instruments are weak or invalid (Wooldridge, 
2002). Alternatively, through first-differencing the equation, GMM utilizes the lags o f the 
differences to serve as instruments. By creating a set o f instruments from within the existing 
dataset, GMM generates a larger number o f instruments than what would be available in 2SLS 
(Bond, 2002).
In this study, the GMM estimates are implemented in two stages, beginning with the 
following equation:
yi;t = «yi,t-i + yWi>t + yXi;t + (rji + u\+) (1)
where y is the outcome variable (net tuition revenue per FTE) for institution i in period t, y t^-i is 
the lagged value o f the outcome, y is the parameter estimate, W is the vector o f endogenous 
variables, X is the vector o f exogenous variables, rj is the unobserved time-invariant institution- 
specific effect and u is the error term. If we were to apply OLS regression to this model, the 
estimates would be inconsistent because the lagged variable (yi,t-i) is correlated with the error 
tenn {rji + u^) through the subscript i (Bond, 2002).
The first stage takes the first-difference o f equation (1) to eliminate the unobserved 
institutional-specific effects ( / / i ) :
yi,t -  yi,t-i = «(yi,t-i - yut-2 ) + y(w u - w u-i) + (7x i,t - yXi;t-i) + (uxV - wi;t) (2)
In the second stage (3), the lagged values o f endogenous predictors are instrumented in 
subsequent first-differences. These new instruments are correlated with the predictor variable, 
while remaining orthogonal to the error term. The "system" GMM technique implemented in 
this study takes advantage o f both levels and differences o f  the data, for more details see
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Blundell & Bond (1998) and Roodman (2006). The final model is expressed through the 
following equation:
A t = a +  P  iyi.t-1 + 72(Wi,t - Wi,t-i) + 73(Xi)t - X ia_i) + (wi;t - (3)
where y  is the inflation-adjusted net tuition revenue per FTE, a is the intercept, W is the vector 
of endogenous variables and X is the vector o f exogenous variables for each institution (z) in 
each period o f time (t). The error term, u, is robust to small sample sizes (Windmeijer, 2005).
The successful implementation o f GMM requires that the instruments meet two 
conditions. First, instruments must provide a source o f variation for the model and secondly the 
lags must provide an exogenous source o f variation for the model (Roodman, 2006). To meet 
the first condition, instruments must be strong and this strength can be identified through the 
first-stage two-stage least square F-value. If the F-value is greater than 10, then the instruments 
are generally considered to be strong although this is only a rule o f thumb that econometricians 
have yet to agree upon (Angrist, 2006; Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995; Stock & Yogo, 2002). To 
meet the second condition, instruments must be valid; the Hansen-J test with a chi-square 
distribution is implemented to address instrument validity. If the Hansen-J test is significant, 
then the instruments are systematically correlated with the error term, rendering them invalid. 
Table 4 provides information on the strength and validity o f the instruments, concluding that all 
instruments are valid and three are unambiguously strong.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
After implementing the GMM model, autocorrelation has successfully been addressed 
and eliminated from the model as evidenced by the rejection o f the null AR(2) Arellano-Bond 
hypothesis (Arellano & Bond, 1991). One additional caveat when implementing GMM 
techniques rests with the total number o f instruments utilized in the model. It is possible for
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researchers to include too many instruments, which yields an artificial improvement to the 
consistency o f parameter estimates (Roodman, 2009). One rule o f thumb is that the number of 
instruments does not exceed the number o f groups. When this occurs, the model is over­
identified and estimates are biased. This analysis utilizes 73 and 99 instruments for Models 1 
and 2, respectively, and a total o f 175 groups.
M odels with quadratic predictors. The funded and unfunded discount rates are 
introduced into the model as linear predictors o f net tuition revenue. Their quadratic values are 
also introduced to account for the potential diminishing returns that are expected to exist with the 
outcome variable. Under the diminishing return principle, the linear relationship should yield 
positive coefficient estimates representing an upward-sloping relationship between discount rates 
and net tuition revenue. The quadratic value is expected to be negatively-sloping which would 
indicate that at some point the linear value begins to diminish downwards toward zero. By 
calculating the vertex o f these coefficients, one is able to estimate the point at which discount 
rates begin to diminish net tuition revenues.
Limitations. This study is limited in various ways. First, the data source does not enable 
us to examine all public four-year institutions for all years between 2002 and 2008. Only those 
submitting state residency data and those providing institutional aid were included in this study, 
which limited the total number o f observations to account for approximately one-third o f the 
total public four-year population. While there is no way to address this data limitation, caution 
should be taken when interpreting and generalizing these results. Second, the GMM technique 
cannot be implemented for separate Carnegie Groups because the number o f instruments would 
invariably be larger than the number o f within-group observations. It is possible that variations 
among Carnegie groups exist, but the GMM technique used in this paper would be inappropriate
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for such an analysis. Finally, the GMM model is designed to offer a parsimonious solution to the 
challenges associated with instrumental variables. While all instruments are jointly va lid  in this 
study, some are only moderately strong  (SAT and percent poor) demonstrating that GMM 
models are not necessarily immune to the challenges associated with instrumental variable 
techniques. Difference GMM techniques significantly suffer from weak instrument bias, so 
system GMM is employed in this paper to address this limitation.
K ey findings
The average discount rate for institutions in this sample is 15.9 percent; disaggregated by 
aid source, the unfunded discount rate is 11.6 percent and the funded rate is 4.3 percent (Table 
3). These rates have remained relatively stable between the years 2002 and 2008. However, 
total expenditures on institutional aid have increased 54 percent during the years studied, 
increasing from $2.4 in 2002 to $3.7 billion in 2008 as have net tuition revenues. This paper has 
explored the nature o f this relationship, asking to what extent tuition discounting may be a 
mediating factor in tuition revenue generation. Is there a systematic relationship between aid and 
net tuition revenue after controlling for other factors such as tuition, enrollment, and other 
institutional characteristics?
Results from this study identify a non-trivial and systematic pattern between average 
institutional tuition discount rates and net tuition revenue. More specifically, unfunded discounts 
generate gains in net tuition revenue, ceteris paribus, but these gains will eventually begin to 
diminish after a certain threshold. The economic model (Model 1) offers a conservative estimate 
of this threshold, as this model does not control for such important contextual factors as 
enrollment profile, external subsidies, and selectivity; the full model (Model 2) accounts for 
these factors and offers a less conservative estimate for this threshold. When interpreting the
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results, it is important to bear in mind that the discount rate represents the average institution- 
level discount rate which is expected to vary for each individual aid recipient.
Results from Model 1 conform well to the economic theory described above. Holding all 
else equal, tuition rates for in-state students express a positive relationship with net tuition 
revenue. Institutions charging higher tuition prices yield greater net tuition revenue, which 
would be expected according to the economic model. Similarly, institutions enrolling a greater 
quantity o f students (from both in- and out-of-state) also generate greater quantities o f net tuition 
revenue, holding all else equal. Tuition and enrollment are expected to have positive 
relationships with net tuition revenue, as expressed in Model 1.
The Model 1 coefficient estimates for funded and unfunded tuition discounts also behave 
in ways that conform to economic theory. One-unit increases in both funded and unfunded 
average discount rates yield positive gains to net tuition revenue, ceteris paribus. However, the 
squared value o f these discount rates is negative, indicating a hill-shaped relationship between 
discounts and net tuition revenue. Financial gains from discounting are experienced, but only to 
a certain point. The point at which gains begin to level off and diminish towards zero differs for 
both funded and unfunded aid. A one-unit increase in the funded discount rate is associated with 
an $83.42 per FTE increase in net tuition revenue. When the funded discount rate reaches 
approximately 19 percent, however, these marginal benefits begin to diminish. Similarly, 
unfunded discounts yield $13.21 per FTE gains in net tuition revenue but this financial benefit 
begins to diminish when unfunded discounts reach 9 percent.
Using the purely economic model, one can empirically support the theoretical 
relationships described in Cheslock (2006), Martin (2005) and Breneman et al. (2001).
However, the relationship between aid and net tuition revenue is expected to vary depending on
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institutional characteristics. Such factors as state appropriations, minority and low-income 
student enrollment, selectivity, and SAT scores are expected to be mediating factors that shape 
the extent to which aid can be leveraged for net tuition revenue gains. Model 2 builds upon the 
purely economic model by controlling for these additional variables, which results in a less 
conservative tipping-point estimate between discounts and net tuition revenue gains. After 
adding these controls, Model 2 finds similar patterns with all the economic variables except for 
funded discount rates which are no longer found to be statistically significant.
In Model 2, the economic variables continue to confonn to the expectations o f economic 
theory where tuition and enrollment remain positively associated with net tuition revenue. 
Unfunded tuition discounts express a positive relationship with net tuition revenue where a one- 
unit increase in the discount rate yields a $14.40 increase in net tuition revenue per FTE. The 
point at which the marginal financial benefit o f unfunded discounts begins to level off and 
diminish towards zero is estimated at 12.7 percent. So, an institution that offers unfunded tuition 
discounts will be expected to generate net tuition gains up to approximately 13 percent, but 
beyond this point the net tuition revenue per FTE is estimated to decline.
Findings from Models 1 and 2 empirically support what has been theoretically described 
in the tuition discounting literature. That is, tuition discounts from unfunded sources can yield 
financial benefits to public colleges and universities. Public sector institutional leaders may be 
inclined to follow their private sector counterparts by leveraging aid to generate tuition revenues; 
however, results from this study indicate that discounting practices run the risk o f fiscal 
insolvency. Institutions may desire to aid all students for various reasons, but the financial 
reality is that there are significant financial risks associated with aiding students from unfunded 
revenue streams. Findings suggest that unfunded tuition discounts can be used for revenue
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management but they begin to erode revenues when the rate exceeds 13 percent. Funded 
discount rates do not have a systematic pattern across the two models, so the following section 
will synthesize the implications associated with unfunded tuition discounts and will offer 
suggestions for further research. Results from the two models are provided in Table 5 below. 
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Conclusions and further research
The primary purpose o f this study was to identify whether or to what extent tuition 
discounting yields net financial benefits to public four-year college and university budgets.
Much o f the literature on tuition discounting focuses on the enrollment management function of 
aiding students, leaving a gap in what is known concerning discounting’s role in revenue 
management. Given the austere fiscal environment in the public sector, colleges and universities 
are looking for ways to maximize revenue from all sources — particularly student tuition 
revenue.
This study concluded that public institutions are able to leverage unfunded discounts to 
generate net tuition revenue, but after the rate exceeds approximately 13 percent these benefits 
begin to diminish. The average unfunded discount for the sample is 11.6 percent indicating that 
a significant amount o f institutions may be running discounts near or beyond a point o f economic 
efficiency. Of the 174 institutions included in this study, 89 offered unfunded discounts in 
excess o f 13 percent between the years 2002 and 2008. These institutions may be at the greatest 
risk o f diminishing their net tuition revenues due to their discounting practices.
Three key implications are associated with these findings. First, the practice o f aiding 
students from unfunded sources has significant opportunity costs that may potentially interfere 
with other institutional objectives. Since unfunded discounts are made available through
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operating budgets, resources that support aid programs may be competing with other institutional 
priorities. While the scope o f this analysis did not examine the tradeoffs associated with 
spending money on financial aid, the nature o f aiding students from unfunded sources will 
inevitably impact other institutional objectives.
Institutional aid expenditures are the fastest-growing item in most public colleges’ 
budgets. This practice accounts for billions o f dollars each year and in tight financial times 
every dollar spent is viewed with scrutiny. This is especially true with regard to expenditures 
that are not central to the teaching, research, and service missions o f public institutions. If a 
college is aiding students through unfunded sources, then internal stakeholders such as faculty, 
trustees, and non-aided students may begin to scrutinize the collective benefits (particularly those 
associated with net tuition revenue) that are generated by engaging in this practice. The ability 
to anticipate and identify these opportunity costs may become increasingly relevant to those 
institutions seeking to increase their unfunded tuition discount rate. Further research could 
examine whether and to what extent changes in institutional aid expenditures are associated with 
systematic changes in “mission-critical” or other institutional expenditures items.
Second, an institution’s desire to achieve enrollment management objectives and their 
capacity to generate tuition revenue are two competing but reconcilable goals. Tuition 
discounting programs are often viewed as enrollment management tools for crafting a class o f  
desirable students, but they also serve revenue management functions. By strategically targeting 
aid, it is possible for institutions to maximize (or at least enhance) net tuition revenues.
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to posit that institutions can jointly strive for crafting a class o f  
desirable students while simultaneously enhancing their revenue profiles. Further research 
should continue to explore how institutional aid programs are impacting the enrollment profile o f
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students and  revenue outcomes for institutions. Some colleges have initiated “no-loan” 
programs where funded discounts are targeted to students who qualify for need and non-need- 
based criteria. Research could examine the extent to which the initiation o f these programs has 
simultaneously enhanced enrollment goals (e.g. student diversity) and  revenue goals.
And third, aggressive price discounting from unfunded sources has non-trivial impacts on 
the financial wellbeing o f public institutions. University administrators may be inclined to offer 
discounts to craft a class, but these efforts can only be sustained to a certain threshold.
Eventually, institutions that aid students from unfunded sources will approach economic 
inefficiencies that are neither politically nor financially sustainable. In today’s financial climate 
where institutions are challenged to “do more with less,” campus leaders will face greater 
accountability demands from trustees, budget officials, and academic leadership to operate 
discounting programs that enhance tuition revenues. Institutions that operate “deep” discounts 
will likely need to revisit their strategies and find new ways to achieve enrollment objectives 
without accentuating financial risks. To inform practice in this area, further research could 
examine the characteristics associated with those institutions falling beyond the 13 percent 
threshold found to diminish net tuition revenues; perhaps these institutions enroll many lower- 
income students that have unmet financial need, or perhaps they are positioned low in college 
ranking guides and are using aid to recruit students with high SAT scores. These questions are 
beyond the scope o f this paper, but further research could examine how these institutions allocate 
aid based on need and non-need criteria.
In conclusion, colleges offering no tuition discounts are bound to set themselves at a 
competitive disadvantage in today’s academic marketplace. Today’s environment makes aiding 
students from campus operating budgets a common business practice in the public sector of
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higher education. Institutions may desire to offer aid to all students, but they are economically 
constrained from doing so; as a result, they offer aid to a select group o f students in ways that are 
not always economically efficient. Ultimately, every institution must design its discounting 
strategy that fits its own unique circumstances, but this study raises awareness o f the financial 
risks associated with tuition discounting.
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Table 1: Changes in public four-year college and universities’ 
(n=175) revenues from net tuition and state appropriations. 















Dollar change, 2002-08 $ 1,693 











Table 2: Public four-year colleges and universities’ (n=175) average institutional aid 
expenditures and discount rates by source o f funds____________________________________
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2002 $326 $691 $1,017 5.3% 11.5% 16.8%
2003 $310 $708 $1,018 4.7% 10.9% 15.6%
2004 $302 $798 $ 1 , 10 0 4.2% 1 1 .2 % 15.4%
2005 $311 $835 $1,146 4.0% 1 1 . 1 % 15.1%
2006 $326 $897 $1,223 4.0% 1 1 .6% 15.6%
2007 $310 $994 $1,304 3.8% 12.4% 16.2%
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T able 3: D escrip tiv e  statistics o f  exp lan a to ry  and  ou tcom e variab les u sed  in  reg ressio n  
equation , pub lic  fou r-year co lleges and  un iversities  on ly  (n=175)______________________
V ariab le M ean Std. D ev.
In s titu tio n ’s n e t tu ition  revenue  p e r u n d erg rad u a te  F T E $5,952 $2,429
P ercen t o f  u nderg radua tes w ho  are ethn ic m inorities 26 .7% 18.7%
E stim a ted  m ed ian  SA T  score o f  incom ing  fresh m an  class 1,062 108
P ercen t o f  underg rad u a te  app lican ts  ad m itted  (se lectiv ity ) 73.3% 15.7%
P ercen t o f  un d erg rad u a tes  w hose  fam ily  incom e is less th an  S30,000 10.0% 5.0%
Institu tiona l rev en u e  from  state app ropria tions p e r undergrad . F T E $7,478 $3,599
In -sta te  estim ated  underg rad u a te  F T E  en ro llm en t 9,847 7,736
O ut-o f-sta te  estim ated  underg radua te  F T E  en ro llm en t 2 ,329 3,247
P u b lish ed  in -sta te  tu itio n  and  fees $5,352 $1,810
P u b lish ed  ou t-o f-sta te  tu itio n  and  fees $13 ,999 $4,780
A verage  funded  d isco u n t ra te 4 .3% 4.9%
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T able 4: F -sta tis tics  fo r firs t-stage  2SL S  fixed  
effec t estim ate  o f  in stru m en t streng th  (n=175)
F -sta tis tic
P ercen t m in o rity  en ro llm en t 406 .45***
S elec tiv ity  (%  adm itted) 9 5 2 ***
M ed ian  SA T  o f  incom ing  cohort 99.28***
In -sta te  F T E  en ro llm en t 97.07***
O ut-o f-sta te  F T E  en ro llm en t 27 .98***
P ercen t low -in co m e en ro llm en t 12.67***
F u n d ed  d isco u n t ra te 16.59***
U nfu n d ed  d iscoun t rate 19.20***









Table 5: Regression models explaining net tuition revenue per FTE, 2002-2008
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Model 1 Model 2
























Funded discount rate (%) -0.228



















Selectivity (% admitted) " -354.017
(172.135)
**
Percent minority enrollment " -190.896
(147.037)
Median SAT of incoming cohort " 1.143
(.349)
***
Percent low-income enrollment " 1,834.410
(403.259)
**








Num. of groups 175 143
Num. of instruments 73 99
Post-hoc tests
Arellano-Bond test fo r  AR(1) 0 .000 *** 0 .000 ***
Arellano-Bond test fo r  AR(2) 0.321 0.412
Hansen J  test statistic 0.071 * 0.444
Difference-in Hansen 0.421 0.778
Note: Small sample standard errors (Windmeijer, 2004) presented in parenthesis 
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F igure  1.
T he econom ic re la tio n sh ip  b e tw een  en ro llm ent, tu ition , and  aid
